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Competition Between Software-as-a-Service Vendors
Dan Ma, Member, IEEE, and Robert J. Kauffman, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We propose a model of software-as-a-service (SaaS) in
a competitive marketplace that brings clarity to the choices that
competing vendors must make for pricing and quality strategy. We
focus on several features of SaaS competition, including differences
in vendor offerings, incomplete information on application func-
tionality, the potential lock-in risk of SaaS clients, and their cost of
learning about what it will take to make the vendors’ software work
well. Clients can sample the fit costs of adoption, but can switch to
another vendor. We obtained several findings through the use of a
game-theoretic model. First, a client’s switching cost is important
for its decision-making regarding SaaS adoption. With a relatively
high switching cost, a more cost-efficient vendor of IT services will
be able to drive the less cost-efficient competitor out of its market.
Second, the impact of the client’s switching cost on vendors works
differently. An increase in switching cost enables one vendor to
charge a higher price and achieve higher profit, while the other
will be forced to charge a lower price and hardly make a profit.
Third, what matters is not how much a vendor can enhance service
quality, but instead how costly it will be to improve quality enough
to attract sufficient customer interest to achieve profitability.
Index Terms—Adverse and beneficial lock-in, cost efficiency,
economic analysis, quality, services sampling, software-as-a-
service (SaaS), strategy, switching costs, vendor competition.
I. INTRODUCTION
SOFTWARE-AS-A-SERVICE (SaaS) is a cloud computingservice in which information technology (IT) resources, in-
cluding computing power, data storage, software applications,
and technical infrastructure, are delivered to users through a net-
work. Due to the rapid growth of the Internet, advances in tele-
com technologies and the drop in bandwidth costs, as well as the
increasing use of productivity tools for the web, we have seen
market interest and adoption of SaaS skyrocket [20]. Clients
have wanted to reduce software and computing-related invest-
ment and operating costs, as well as by the interest of vendors
to find new sources of revenues and profits.
We explore problems that IT clients face when they are in-
terested in obtaining the help of a SaaS vendor to meet their
on-demand computing needs. A client needs to figure out how
to obtain the best long-term risk-adjusted rate of return from the
services offered by the vendor it chooses to work with. Simi-
larly, SaaS vendors need to have knowledge about clients’ spe-
cific business needs, since the product they offer related to the
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outsourcing of some aspects of their clients’ business processes
may be new to them also. They may not know all they need
in order to effectively incentivize potential clients, price their
offerings, invest in delivering services of appropriate quality,
and act to retain their customers.
To help the clients and vendors, we seek answers to several
research questions that relate to the SaaS marketplace. What are
the pricing strategy and service quality choices a SaaS vendor
should employ to perform well in competition with another
SaaS vendor? To what extent should a vendor’s applications
and services be differentiated from its competitor’s applications
and services? How should clients choose an appropriate vendor
when they face incomplete information on vendors’ offerings
and potential risk of being locked in?
A. SaaS Market
In the past decade, SaaS delivery has outpaced traditional
software application delivery, growing nearly five times faster
than the software market as a whole, and has become a sig-
nificant growth driver for the expansion of all software markets
[30].1 SaaS vendors bundle their software applications with sup-
porting IT services to deliver new levels of value to their clients.
The clients, meanwhile, must subscribe to use applications that
are installed in a centralized location, and run and maintained
by the vendor. Instead of purchasing and owning the software,
the clients pay a fixed monthly or annual subscription fee to
use the software applications.2 Most SaaS offerings do not re-
quire one-time upfront payments though.3 In many cases, SaaS
may be cheaper for a firm than an in-house system; clients ex-
pect to save on support and upgrade costs, IT infrastructure, IT
personnel, and implementation.
There are pros and cons with the SaaS business model. The
benefits involve scalability, reliability, ease of deployment and
management for clients, and rapid cost savings. The benefits
trade off against the client’s worries about trust, privacy, cus-
tomization problems, performance, and ownership [14], [21].
1By 2015, about 24% of all new business software purchases will be for
service-enabled software, and SaaS delivery will amount to more than 13% of
worldwide software spending. The latest Gartner [25] projections suggest that
global spending for SaaS will rise by nearly 18% in 2013 to US$14.5 billion,
and to around US$26.5 billion by 2016.
2There are three layers of services in cloud computing: infrastructure-as-a-
service (IaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS), and SaaS. Vendors operate them
with the same general business approach: they deliver computing resources as
services to clients through a network. Though there are similarities, the SaaS
business model has some unique features that are not shared by PaaS or IaaS.
For example, the SaaS vendor maintains only one copy of the software and
related data on its server. Also, the vendors’ pricing strategy for SaaS typically
is more complicated than for IaaS and PaaS. For the latter, the vendors simply
assign prices based per GB or per CPU hour. For SaaS, so far no standard pricing
approach has been embraced on an industry-wide basis.
3For instance, Salesforce.com (www.salesforce.com) charges a monthly sub-
scription fee of US$65 per user per month. It is free to subscribe as a user of
Saleforce.com. No upfront fee is required.
0018-9391 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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Although the debates continue, today the SaaS software busi-
ness model is widely viewed as having shaken the foundations
of the software industry, and moving the new practices from
niche status to mainstream popularity.
The SaaS business model has a number of novel character-
istics. First, software applications from a SaaS vendor are ex-
perience goods for the people and organizations that use them.
In the SaaS market, however, firm-specific and individualized
customization is not the main thrust.4 This is due to its mul-
titenancy structure: vendors host one instance of the software
on one server and maintain client data on one database [29].
This allows SaaS to achieve economies of scale for database
management and code maintenance, which creates the basis for
the related cost savings [41]. Multitenancy weighs against the
customization of software applications, since the source code
cannot be changed. SaaS vendors will have a hard time to profit
by developing and maintaining versions to suit each of their
clients. Instead, clients have to accept more standardized func-
tionality, and absorb the risks of the ineffective fit.5
SaaS acts like an experience good for the clients: it will take
a while for clients to figure out how well the software will work
with their existing IT components. Also, because SaaS involves
the payment of periodic fees instead of a large initial investment,
clients will retain the option to switch to another vendor if they
believe it is appropriate to do so. We have observed the sampling
and switching behavior of SaaS clients in industry practice. Most
SaaS providers offer clients no-fee sampling: clients can use the
SaaS application free-of-charge, typically for one month, and
if it does not meet expectations, they can stop using it with no
payment required.6
Switching, in the SaaS market is not free though, due to
the nature of the business relationship between a SaaS client
and its vendor. In the SaaS context, a client typically needs to
move its data to the vendor’s server, and the vendor handles
all the IT support services, including daily maintenance of the
software, data backups, software upgrades, and security. Close
partnerships like this are likely to cause lock-in risk for the
client based on the actions of the vendor [31]. Another risk is
that the client may lose control over its data and applications,
4Clients must figure out the functionality of software applications and match
them to their business needs, and subsequently understand how they can be
integrated into existing legacy systems and technical infrastructures. In the
traditional software market, users usually manage such risks by customizing
the software they build or buy, to be sure that their applications address their
business needs.
5Vendors in SaaS and cloud computing often create application configura-
tions with pre-defined and adjusted scope to address the known circumstances
of use. The main difference between customization and configuration is that the
latter does not involve source code changes, whereas customization does [27].
Some configuration is possible in SaaS, which can be set up with pre-defined
parameters to change software functionality to some extent, but beyond some
cost-effective pre-defined range of functionality, SaaS is not intended to offer
customized solutions.
6For example, a newly registered client of Salesforce.com or Oracle On-
demand CRM is given 30-day free trial use of the SaaS product – which essen-
tially encourages the client to sample the SaaS vendor before total consumption
periods start. After this “sampling” period, the client will retain the option to not
use the SaaS vendor—a switching option exists. According to a recent industry
report, the conversion rates from sampling to long term consumption of SaaS
product is only about 25% [42], showing how frequent it is for clients to sample
and switch.
and become dependent on the external vendor in ways that
create unexpected vulnerabilities. Shifting away from a specific
vendor will require the client to experience data transfer and
recovery costs, which are significant switching costs a client
must consider when making decisions.
Firm-to-firm competition in the SaaS market is not well un-
derstood. To address this gap, we propose a duopoly market
structure model with key features of the SaaS market. This
offers opportunities for creating new theory, while providing
insights on problems that involve IT strategy.
B. Theoretical Background
Researchers have studied SaaS from multiple perspectives.
Some have looked at SaaS contract design [48]. Others have
studied software functionality investments under SaaS [11]. Var-
ious authors have analyzed optimal pricing strategies for SaaS
in a monopoly market structure [10], [12], [28]. And still oth-
ers have focused on SaaS’s impact on the traditional software
market [4], [22], [24], [37], [38]. We investigate the competition
between SaaS vendors.7 We identify and recommend appropri-
ate price and quality choice strategies in the SaaS marketplace.
Our research draws on different streams: competition with het-
erogeneous products and switching costs.
1) Competition With Heterogeneous Products: Different ap-
proaches are possible [5]. Competition with horizontal hetero-
geneity was inspired by Hotelling’s linear model and Salop’s
circular model [46]. The latter represents consumer tastes in a
circle, and vendors compete by selecting how to position their
products. Spatial competition models showed that products with
different features enable vendors to avoid direct competition [3],
[17], [18]. Differentiation in product features enables a vendor
to attract local clients, raise prices, and achieve higher profit. In
the SaaS market, users want customized applications to fit their
business needs, but the multitenant structure makes customiza-
tion hard. So a horizontal differentiation model is appropriate
for the issue of fit between a user’s software requirements and
the application offered by a vendor.
In contrast, competition with vertical differentiation assumes
that vendors produce products with different quality levels. All
consumers prefer higher quality products, but their willingness-
to-pay for quality varies [49]. Research with vertical differen-
tiation models is common [2], [8], [26], [39], and some have
focused on software market competition [11]. With SaaS, ven-
dors provide a bundle of application and IT services. The quality
of the IT services, such as up-time and response time, is key
for the choices that clients make. This suggests inclusion of a
quality factor in our analysis with vertical differentiation. This
allows us to investigate the outcome when SaaS vendors exhibit
7Increasingly fierce competition is occurring between SaaS vendors in
almost every software niche market. Two giants, Salesforce and Oracle
(www.oracle.com)—nearly a duopoly—compete in the on-demand customer
relationship management (CRM) software market, for example. Oracle Elo-
qua (www.eloqua.com), Marketo (www.marketo.com) and Pardot (www.pardot.
com) also go head-to-head in the on-demand market for marketing campaign
automation services. In addition, FinancialForce (www.financialforce.com) and
Intacct (www.intacct.com) are fighting it out in the specialized market for fi-
nancial accounting systems-focused SaaS.
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horizontal differentiation in their software’s features, and verti-
cal differentiation in IT service qualities.
2) Role of Switching Costs: Switching costs are important in
the conventional wisdom. Some researchers have argued that the
possibility of switching makes a product less attractive and re-
duces a consumer’s ex ante willingness-to-pay [9], [49]. Hence,
prices should be reduced to incentivize a rational consumer to
participate. As a result, the market will be more competitive
when there are higher switching costs. Others have disagreed.
They argue that switching costs reduce market competitiveness,
raise prices, and support customer lock-in [6], [23], [32]–[34].
In their models, vendors are allowed to charge different prices in
each period. They found that vendors price aggressively to ex-
ploit their existing customers. High switching costs also support
higher vendor prices and profits, leading to a less competitive
market. Other recent research suggests the relationship between
switching costs and equilibrium prices may not be simple. Dube´
et al. [19], and Shin and Sudhir [47] have demonstrated that
prices may fall with low switching costs and rise as switching
costs become high.
Switching costs affect SaaS clients. Clients face lock-in risk
because their data are stored, managed, and maintained in a cen-
tral location run by the vendor. Once a client wants to stop the
use of the existing vendor, it must bear the costs of recovering
and moving data out, which is significant in most business set-
tings. Similar to the past works in switching cost literature, in
the SaaS setting, the presence of switching costs is likely to en-
able the vendor to charge higher prices, exploit its clients more,
and achieve a higher profit – in the short run at least. On the
other hand, different from the literature that switching typically
happens when the vendor makes price adjustment after a period
of real consumption, switching in our model is triggered by the
lack of fit between the client’s specific requirements on software
attributes and the vendor’s standardized offering, after a free-
of-charge sampling period. Still, how will vendors implement
strategies that recognize the role of pricing choices relative to
clients’ switching costs?
To study the competition between SaaS vendors, a multi-
factor model is appropriate, including differentiated software
functionality and service qualities, operational costs, multite-
nancy transaction costs, ex ante incomplete information on the
clients’ side, and switching costs. We will develop and analyze
this kind of model of competition. We want to see how these
factors interact with each other and determine how the SaaS
competition will play out. To our knowledge, this has not been
investigated before.
II. MODELING SAAS VENDOR COMPETITION IN THE MARKET
We study two competing vendors, Vendor H and Vendor L,
in the market. Each delivers a bundle of software applications
and IT services to its clients through a network.
A. Competing SaaS Vendors
SaaS vendors differ in two dimensions. First, their software
has different attributes and features, which makes them hori-
zontally differentiated competitors. Following Salop [46], we
Fig. 1. Salop circle for vendor pricing, quality strategy.
TABLE I
MODELING NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
Notation Definitions
I Vendor’s initial setup cost to offer SaaS to new clients
S Switching cost borne by the client when switching vendor
cH , cL Per period recurring service cost for Vendors H and L
qH , qL IT service quality for Vendors H and L
pH , pL Per period price for Vendors H and L
θh , θl Willingness-to-pay for SaaS quality by client type
di Distance between client’s ideal application and vendor’s
functionality, for Vendor i  {H, L}
T Client’s utility loss per unit distance in the spatial model
t · di Client’s total utility loss for applications mismatched to
client’s tech infrastructure and business needs when client is
using SaaS vendor i, i  {H, L}; this a client’s FitCost.
U(θj , qi , di ) Utility of Client j with willingness-to-pay for IT service
quality θj , where j ∈ {h, l}, when Vendor i is used. We
also use U to mean total utility. See proof of Lemma 1.
Δp = pH − pL Price difference between SaaS vendors
Δq = qH − qL Service quality difference between SaaS vendors; measures
vendors’ vertical differentiation level
Δθ = θh − θl Willingness-to-pay difference for Clients h and l; measures
clients’ vertical differentiation level
Δc = cH − cL Service cost difference for SaaS vendors
ΔcΔq Unit cost of IT service quality difference; large values
suggest quality is expensive to push to a higher level;
measures cost efficiency of SaaS
assume that the vendors’ product space is a circle of unit cir-
cumference. The two vendors are differentiated maximally in
the spatial competition.8 That is, their products will be located
at positions opposite to each other on the circle, with a distance
of 0.5 between them. Second, they offer IT services of different
quality levels, which also makes them vertically differentiated
competitors. Vendor H is a higher quality vendor that offers
services of higher quality qH in the market, while Vendor L
is a lower quality vendor that offers services of lower quality
qL , with Δq = qH − qL > 0. (See Fig. 1 below, and Table I for
our modeling notation.) Each vendor’s quality level is common
knowledge in the market, since in the SaaS context, service-level
8We follow the principle of maximum product differentiation, proposed by
D’Aspremont et al. [16] for application in duopolistic spatial competition. The
competing vendors differentiate themselves as much as possible in the product
space so that they can avoid head-to-head price competition. Many authors used
this principle in the spatial competition literature [3], [17], [ 18]. In practice,
differentiation is effective to reduce price competition [35], [43].
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agreements (SLAs) have been extensively used to describe and
guarantee a vendor’s service quality.9
A SaaS vendor has two types of costs: I, the initial setup
cost to start the business with a new client, and c, the ven-
dor’s service cost for delivering services. When it acquires a
new customer, the vendor’s one-time setup cost, I, is small and
will include the effort it makes to understand the technical ar-
chitecture and business needs of the new client. It will include
the costs of moving the user’s data to a centralized location
and making other relationship-related arrangements too. The
vendor’s recurring service cost c involves maintaining client
databases and application code, providing IT services, and man-
aging data security. The service cost difference between vendor
is Δc = cH − cL > 0, indicating that delivering higher service
quality requires the vendor to bear a higher service cost. The ven-
dors charge clients a fixed subscription price each period. Their
prices are pH and pL , and their difference is Δp = pH − pL .
B. SaaS Clients
Clients express heterogeneous preferences for different soft-
ware attributes. This is captured by their even distribution on
the circle. A client’s location represents the ideal application
for the client. It is most likely an individually customized soft-
ware application, which fits the client’s specific IT requirements
and business environment, and can be integrated into its legacy
systems.
The multitenancy of SaaS disallows the client from obtaining
an ideal application. The vendor will offer a standard application
on a centralized server. The client will suffer a loss of utility due
to the mismatch between what the vendor offers and what the
client needs. We call such losses of utility the FitCost. In our
model, such cost is measured by t d, where d is the distance
between the client’s and vendor’s positions on the Salop circle,
and t measures the client’s utility loss per unit distance. Fig. 1
depicts a Client j, located at position ♦, and the two vendors, H
and L, at a distance 0.5 from each other. The distance from this
Client j to Vendor H is dH and to Vendor L is dL , and so FitCost
for this client using Vendor H is t dH and for Vendor L it is t dL .
All clients prefer higher service quality, but their individual
levels of willingness-to-pay are different. We assume there are
two types of clients: a type θh client is the one with higher
willingness-to-pay and is willing to spend more to obtain a
higher level of service quality than a type θl client, with lower
willingness-to-pay. The difference, Δθ = θh − θl > 0, mea-
sures the two types of clients’ differences in their levels of
willingness-to-pay for quality. We assume there is equal repre-
sentation in the market for each of the client types.
The utility function for Client j, when it uses Vendor i’s
SaaS, is
U(θj , qi , di) = θj qi − pi − tdi. (1)
9In a typical SLA, productivity (uptime and network availability), service
quality (response time, performance), problem resolution procedures, and pro-
visions for system and data security are defined in detail. Thus, we assume that
SaaS vendors are able to reduce their service quality uncertainty through the
use of SLAs.
Fig. 2. Decision tree and payoffs for Client j.
Here, i ∈ {H,L} indicates Vendor H or L, and j ∈ {h, l}
indicates the client type h or l, associated with this client’s
willingness-to-pay levels θh or θl ; qi is the level of service
quality offered by Vendor i; pi is the SaaS subscription price
per period charged by Vendor i; and di measures the distance
between Client j and Vendor i in the circular product space. The
last term, t di , is FitCost; the utility loss Client j experiences
from a less-than-ideal application from Vendor i.
C. Sampling and Switching
Software applications are experience goods for the clients that
use them. Without seeing how a vendor’s application actually
runs over time, the client will be not able to predict how well a
standardized SaaS application will fit its business needs or will
be easily integrated into its legacy systems. This information
can be learned after using the vendor’s SaaS application for a
period of time. To represent this aspect of SaaS, that a potential
client will not know the extent of the vendor’s SaaS application’s
match to its needs, we assume that the two SaaS vendors’ posi-
tions on the circle initially are unknown to all potential clients.
For example, in Fig. 1, Client j does not know the value of dH
and dL , though it knows the price and quality of the vendors,
pH , pL , qH , and qL . As a result, the best this client can do is
to make an estimate of the expected costs that will arise due to
a lack of fit, which is 0.25 t for both vendors, and choose one
that gives higher expected total utility to try out. After using the
SaaS’ application for a period of time, the client will learn the
exact value of dH for H (and dL for L) and therefore the exact
FitCost of dH t for H (and dL · t for L). This process is vendor
sampling.
The client, after sampling, may decide to stop using the ser-
vices of this vendor and switch to another vendor. This will
force the client to face a switching cost, S. In the SaaS market,
switching cost includes the cost of discovering another vendor
with which to make service arrangements, recovering data from
the current vendor, and moving it to the new one.
Fig. 2 shows the decision tree with payoffs for a client j. This
client’s true FitCost for Vendor H is dH t and for Vendor L is
dL t. The client will not know the value of dH or dL ex ante.
The client must make two decisions.
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1) At time 0, decide which vendor’s application to sample
based on the expected FitCost of 0.25 t.
2) At time 1, after sampling and learning, based on the new
information of dH and dL , decide to stay or switch to
another new vendor.
The client’s switching decision involves a threshold strategy:
a client who samples Vendor H and learns the value of dH
will switch if and only if dH > d∗H j , and a client who samples
Vendor L and learns the value of dL will switch if and only if
dL > d
∗
Lj , where the two critical values d∗H j and d∗Lj are the
positions of Vendor H’s and L’s marginal clients, defined and
derived as below. A marginal client of Vendor H is the one that
chooses to sample Vendor H initially and will be indifferent
between staying with Vendor H or switching to Vendor L after
learning the true value of dH . A marginal client of Vendor L can
be defined analogously.
Consider a θj -type client, θj with j ∈ {h, l} the willingness-
to-pay for quality (θh or θl). It is the marginal client of Vendor
H if the client’s distance to Vendor H is d∗H j , given by
θj qH − t d∗H j − pH = θj qL − (0.5− d∗H j )t− pL − S. (2a)
The left-hand side of the equation is the client’s total utility
if it stays with Vendor H after sampling. The decision to switch
will happen after sampling, and so the client will know its true
FitCost for using Vendor H, t d∗H j . The right-hand side is the
client’s total utility based on a switch to Vendor L, where the
true FitCost of using Vendor L is (0.5− d∗H j ) t by the maximal
differentiation rule. Similarly, the marginal θj -type client of
Vendor L is defined by d∗Lj
θj qL − t d∗Lj − pL = θj qH − (0.5− d∗Lj )t− pH − S. (2b)
Solving the equations allows us to determine the critical po-
sitions of marginal clients
d∗H j = 0.25 +
θj ·Δq −Δp
2t
+
S
t
(3a)
d∗Lj = 0.25
θj ·Δq −Δp
2t
+
S
t
(3b)
where j ∈ {h, l} indicates the client types θh and θl .
The location of the marginal client provides the threshold
value for clients when they make switching decisions, as shown
in Fig. 2, and also defines the market share for each vendor. For
example, if all clients choose to sample Vendor H initially, after
clients’ switching, Vendor H, taking its position in the circle as
origin, will serve θh -type clients in the interval of (−d∗H h , d∗H h )
and θl-type clients in (−d∗H l , d∗H l); and Vendor L will serve the
rest.10
D. Two-Stage Game
We next lay out a two-stage game for the competition be-
tween two SaaS vendors. (See Fig. 3.) The first is the client’s
10The final market share and profit function of SaaS vendors depend on
clients’ initial choices of vendors to sample, which depends on the vendors’
prices. We will derive them under three different scenarios in Section 3.
Fig. 3. Timeline for SaaS vendor–client interactions.
Sampling Stage between time 0 and 1, and the second is the
client’s Partnership Stage, which occurs after time 1.11
Prior to time 0, the two SaaS vendors will simultaneously
post prices pH and pL . Their service quality levels, qH and qL ,
will be known by all potential clients from information available
in the market. The FitCost experienced by each client will not
be known though. This reflects uncertainty on the client’s part
about how far it is to a vendor in the Salop circle; the client does
not know the true value of dH and dL . At time 0, a client must
choose one vendor’s offering by comparing the expected utility
from both vendors’s solutions, based on the expected distance of
0.25 to both vendors.12 This trial period will be short, from time
0 to 1, the Sampling Stage, and the client learns how well the
SaaS offering works in its organizational context, and obtains
information about its FitCost.13 At time 1, the client, with new
information dH and dL , will make a decision to remain with its
current vendor or switch to another vendor, should unattractive
FitCost be discovered. In the latter case, the client will have to
bear switching cost S.
After time 1, the Partnership Stage will reflect the stabi-
lization of the service relationship between the client and the
vendor. We assume that both SaaS vendors and clients are utility
maximizers for the profits that they obtain in the second stage.
For simplicity, the discount factor for time is normalized to 1.
We also assume that the vendors will not change their prices
in between the two stages.14 We analyze two SaaS vendors that
11We follow von Weizsacker [50]. Vendors commit to their initial prices
and not change them in the later stage. We make this assumption for these
reasons. First, some SaaS vendors have maintained stable prices for a long time.
Second, by committing to posted prices, SaaS vendors can handle overlapping
generations of clients. Third, it is costly for vendors with clients planning
to switch, and then give them subsidies or price cuts. We acknowledge the
unchanged price in our two-period setting as one of the modeling limitations
and will discuss it later.
12In practice, clients can get quality information through multiple channels,
such as the vendor’s website, a detailed SLA published by the vendor, blogs and
reviews, other firms, and consulting reports, etc.
13We do not consider actions the client can take to accelerate its learning;
instead, we assume it will occur and will benefit the client. We also assume that
there are no contractual costs or relational constraints associated with the client’s
option to switch to a new vendor. This problem has been viewed differently in
other research, which modeled the embedded option as something that a vendor
should price explicitly in its service subscription contracts [7].
14The full-market coverage setup is commonly used in the literature on spatial
competition [36], [40]. Salop [46] showed that when the market is not fully
covered and some clients choose to stay out of the market, it leads to monopolistic
competition: each vendor is a local monopoly and the vendors will not compete
722 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 61, NO. 4, NOVEMBER 2014
Fig. 4. Sampling market outcomes.
compete directly, up to the marginal client. This is also standard
in two-stage games with switching costs [9], [19], [47].
III. ANALYSIS
With two stages—Sampling and Partnership—and clients
that can switch, the market segmentation in the stages will be
different. We refer to them as the Sampling and Relationship
Market Outcomes. The latter is the market equilibrium under
rational client decision-making.
A. Market Outcomes for the Sampling Stage
The Sampling Market Outcome arises from clients’ choices
at time 0, with three outcomes.15
1) (hH, lH): All clients choose to try out Vendor H; Outcome
(θh → H, θl → H).
2) (hL, lL): All clients choose to try out Vendor L; Outcome
(θh → L, θl → L).
3) (hH, lL): Higher willingness-to-pay clients choose Vendor
H and lower willingness-to-pay clients choose Vendor L;
Outcome (θh → H, θl → L).
Although the vendors are differentiated in their application
features and service qualities, at time 0 in the clients’ eyes, they
are only different in their quality levels. The clients have not
yet sampled the application and do not have good information
about the vendor’s FitCost. So clients must estimate the ex-
pected FitCost for both vendors, which is the same for them
at 0.25 · t. The Sampling Market Outcome mimics a vertical
differentiation-only market. (See Fig. 4.)
Our analysis identifies Δp/Δq, the vendors’ price difference-
to-quality difference ratio. It measures how expensive it is for
clients to move to higher quality based on the price per unit for
quality improvement. We find that the ratio Δp/Δq determines
the Sampling Market Outcome: if this ratio Δp/Δq increases
beyond θh (the willingness-to-pay level of the higher valuation
client), all clients will try Vendor L’s offering at time 0. But when
the ratio drops below θl (the willingness-to-pay level of the lower
valuation client), all clients will try Vendor H’s offering initially
instead. In addition, when the value of the ratio is in between
these extremes, the higher willingness-to-pay clients will select
Vendor H, and the lower willingness-to-pay clients will choose
Vendor L. This finding is demonstrated in Fig. 4. (See Lemma
1 in the Appendix.)
Thus, to attract more clients before they know the FitCost,
Vendor H will reduce the price–quality difference, Δp/Δq; Ven-
directly. Since here we are interested in the competition between SaaS vendors,
it is natural to study a fully covered market.
15We assume a tie-breaking rule here. When higher willingness-to-pay clients
(θh ) are indifferent to sample Vendor H or L, they will try out Vendor H; and
when lower willingness-to-pay clients (θl ) are indifferent to sampling Vendor
H or L, they will try out Vendor L. The tie-breaking rule does not affect our
results quantitatively.
dor L will increase it. When two vendors compete on vertical
differentiation—the information about horizontal differentia-
tion is not revealed to clients at time 0—how much clients must
pay for additional quality improvement, indicated by Δp/Δq,
is critical.
B. Toward a Stable Market Equilibrium
We next analyze the market outcome after clients obtain ad-
ditional information about their sampled vendor and make the
switching decision. A stable market equilibrium will emerge
after time 1. The clients’ decision to switch will be based on
new information they acquire on vendor FitCost. The switching
cost diminishes the incentive for clients to change vendors, and
may be used by the vendor to lock in its clients. Our analysis
suggests an upper limit for switching cost, above which no client
will switch to another vendor. (See Lemma 2 in the Appendix.)
We investigated the equilibrium outcomes and assessed the ven-
dors’ strategies for two cases: when they have or do not have
lock-in power over their clients in the market.
Case 1: When vendors have lock-in power, no clients can
switch. This occurs when switching cost is high and exceeds
the upper limit noted in Lemma 2. The vendor sampled in the
first stage will lock in all clients and no switching will occur
in equilibrium. We show that both vendors have the chance to
implement opportunistic pricing, based on their Δc/Δq ratio.16
The ratio Δc/Δq indicates how costly it is for a vendor to
improve its quality and thus measures the cost efficiency of the
SaaS model. This leads to:
Proposition 1 (Opportunistic Pricing): Cost efficiency im-
proving quality in its SaaS business model affects how a vendor
should implement an opportunistic pricing strategy.
1) Higher cost efficiency: When the SaaS model has higher
cost efficiency, Δc/Δq < θl , Vendor H can implement
an opportunistic pricing strategy. At pH = cL + Δqθl , H
will drive L out of the market and serve all clients.
2) Lower cost efficiency: When the SaaS model has lower
cost efficiency, Δc/Δq > θh , Vendor L is able to employ
an opportunistic pricing strategy. At pL = cH −Δqθh , L
will drive H out of the market and serve all clients.
With a higher cost efficiency, it will be cheaper for the ven-
dor to push its SaaS quality to a higher level, according to this
proposition. (See Proposition 1 in the Appendix.) So it makes
sense for Vendor H to implement opportunistic pricing to dom-
inate the market. With a lower cost efficiency, the vendor will
incur substantial costs to improve quality. If so, it makes sense
for Vendor L to implement opportunistic pricing and also try
to dominate the market. As technologies supporting IT delivery
advance, the cost efficiency of SaaS will improve. This implies
that SaaS vendors with higher quality will dominate the market
in the future.
16In the rational expectation equilibrium, clients will be able to foresee the
strong lock-in power of vendors, and they will be cautious when sampling a
vendor. In this case though, the vendor may be able to employ an opportunistic
pricing strategy to drive other competitors out of the market. The first vendor
can charge a low price so its competitors will be unable to profit, but this strategy
requires the first vendor to serve the whole market to make a profit.
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Opportunistic pricing will not be feasible for either SaaS ven-
dor if its cost efficiency is in the mid-range of θl ≤ Δc/Δq ≤
θh . No vendor will be able to undercut its competitor’s price
to drive it out of the market. The vendors must implement
different strategies that enable them to coexist instead. The
only equilibrium outcome will be for the higher willingness-
to-pay clients to choose Vendor H and the lower willingness-to-
pay clients to select Vendor L at time 0, (θh → H, θl → L)
and for clients to stay with their selected vendors after the
Sampling Stage. The vendors’ prices are pL = θlqL − 0.25 t;
pH = θlqL + θhΔq − 0.25 t. (See Lemma 3 in the Appendix.)
The equilibrium prices and market segmentation deserve ad-
ditional consideration. The price pL serves to extract all ex-
pected consumer surplus from the lower willingness-to-pay
clients at time 0. With this price, they will be just willing to
try Vendor L, only with zero expected consumer surplus. On the
other hand, pH will be set at the level that θh type clients will
choose Vendor H on the margin. The expected surplus of θh
clients from the selection of Vendor H will only be marginally
more than from Vendor L. This pricing strategy follows the logic
for a two-product monopoly market. The monopolist should sell
a lower quality product to lower willingness-to-pay consumers,
and its price will extract the available consumer surplus. Mean-
while, the monopolist should sell a higher quality product to
higher willingness-to-pay consumers. The price of the higher
quality product will be just high enough to ensure that con-
sumers in this segment will not be attracted to purchase the
lower quality product. This will result in the market being seg-
mented so there is no direct competition.
This is essentially a noncompetitive market: the two vendors
implement a collusive pricing strategy. Together they behave
like the two-product monopolist described above. They avoid
competing in the same client segment. Instead, each only targets
and serves one client group that has the appropriate level of qual-
ity preference: lower willingness-to-pay clients will buy from
Vendor L, and higher willingness-to-pay clients from Vendor H.
We propose:
Proposition 2 (Nonconfrontational Market Segmentation):
When the SaaS business model has mid-range cost efficiency,
θl ≤ Δc/Δq ≤ θh , both vendors will implement nonconfronta-
tional market segmentation by serving the segments of clients
based on the levels of IS services quality they prefer. This will
ensure no direct vendor competition.
Case 2: When vendors have less lock-in power, some clients
will switch. This is the case when switching cost is not higher
than the upper limit given in Lemma 2, so that after sampling,
some clients will choose to leave the selected vendor (due to
bad fit) and absorb switching cost S.
There are three types of equilibria, corresponding to the three
types of market outcomes in the Sampling Stage. The equilib-
rium, (hH, lH) + Switch, occurs when all clients sample Vendor
H at time 0, leading to the (θh → H, θl → H) Sampling Market
Outcome, and then at time 1, some clients switch from Vendor H
to L. The others are: (hL, lL) + Switch and (hH, lL) +Switch. In
the paper, we will analyze the (hH, lL) + Switch equilibrium. We
will depict its market segmentation, derive the vendors’ objec-
Fig. 5. (hH, lL) + switch equilibrium market outcome.
tive functions, and explain how we solve the equilibrium prices.
(See the Appendix for the solutions for the other equilibria.)
Fig. 5 shows the (hH, lL) + Switch equilibrium outcome.
The positions of the higher willingness-to-pay marginal
clients of Vendor H are marked with “,” and the lower
willingness-to-pay marginal clients of Vendor L with “.” The
distance from Client  to Vendor H is d∗H h and from Client 
to Vendor L is d∗Ll , from (3a) and (3b).
Vendor H: Let Vendor H’s position (H) be the origin. H serves
higher willingness-to-pay clients between (H − ,H + ),
who selected H at time 0 and chose not to switch. The seg-
ment size is 2d∗H h . Vendor H serves lower willingness-to-pay
clients in (H − ,H + ), who selected Vendor L but switched
to Vendor H. The segment size is 2(0.5− d∗Ll).
Vendor L: Next, let Vendor L’s position in the circle (L) be
the new origin. L serves higher willingness-to-pay clients be-
tween (L− , L + ), who selected H at time 0 and chose to
switch to L at time 1. The market segment size is 2(0.5− d∗H h).
Vendor L also serves lower willingness-to-pay clients between
(L− , L + ), who selected L at time 0 and did not switch at
time 1. The segment size is 2d∗Ll .
The vendors assign pH and pL simultaneously to maximize
profit. The decision problems for Vendor H and L are
Max
pH
(pH − cH )(2d∗H h+(1− d∗Ll))− I − (1− d∗Ll)I
Max
pL
(pL − cL )(2d∗Ll+(1− d∗H h))− I − (1− 2d∗H h)I.
In Vendor H’s profit function, the first term is the dis-
counted revenue from serving higher willingness-to-pay clients
in (H − ,H + ) and lower willingness-to-pay clients in
(H − ,H + ). The second term is the setup cost for Ven-
dor H to acquire higher willingness-to-pay clients who chose
Vendor H at time 0. The last term is the setup cost for
Vendor H to acquire lower willingness-to-pay clients who
switched to Vendor H at time 1. Vendor L’s profit function
is similar. By solving the vendors’ optimization problems, we
can obtain equilibrium prices, market shares and profits for
them. (Other equilibrium solutions appear in Lemma 4 in the
Appendix.)
Our analysis shows that, as long as switching cost S is not
high enough to lock in all clients, there are always some clients
that switch after sampling their initial vendor. The two SaaS
vendors will always coexist, suggesting a competitive, not a
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monopolistic marketplace. We will not observe one vendor’s
dominance even when the SaaS model’s cost efficiency is very
high or low. Together with switching cost S, SaaS cost efficiency
(Δc/Δq) now will play a different role:
Proposition 3 (Switching Cost Effects): Switching cost af-
fects the vendors differently in different situations. When the
cost efficiency of the vendor’s SaaS business model is low, an
increase in switching cost makes Vendor L better off via the
higher price and profit, but Vendor H worse off due to the lower
price and profit. When cost efficiency is high, an increase in
switching cost will make Vendor H better off, but Vendor L will
be worse off.
The influence of switching cost is thought to be beneficial to
vendors, because it gives vendors lock-in power with clients. It
also benefits users though, since it increases price competition
among vendors. In the prior work, switching cost was found
to affect competing vendors always in the same way. However,
we show that, in SaaS vendor competition, switching cost may
benefit one but hurt the other vendor, depending on their relative
cost efficiencies. The Switching Cost Effects Proposition (P3)
states that, when the cost efficiency of the SaaS vendor is high,
Vendor H will be the only beneficiary. This is because Vendor
H will be selected by all clients in the Sampling Stage, and will
be the only one with lock-in power. With increases in switching
cost, Vendor H will be able to raise its price for higher prof-
itability. Meanwhile, Vendor L will need to reduce its price, but
even so, it still will experience lower profitability. On the other
hand, Proposition 3 suggests that when the cost efficiency of
the SaaS vendor is low, the relationships will work in reverse:
Vendor L will become the only beneficiary of switching cost.
IV. SAAS VENDOR’S QUALITY STRATEGY
We next evaluate how competing SaaS vendors should strate-
gize about their service qualities.
A. Best Strategies and Best Responses
The Switching Cost Proposition (P3) indicates that the im-
pact of switching cost on vendors may be positive or negative,
depending on the ratio of the change in service and the change
in service cost of the two vendors. Thus, we ask: for the vendor
that faces a competitor with a given level of service quality,
how should it set its service quality level so it will be the only
beneficiary of the switching cost present in the competitive mar-
ketplace? To do this, the vendor’s strategy must enable it to gain
lock-in power in the market, even though this may not entirely
coincide with the price and quality combination that maximizes
the vendor’s profit. This is complex.
To derive the vendor’s quality selection strategy, we refer to
the conditions for different types of market equilibria when the
vendors do not have lock-in power over their clients. Which
type of equilibrium will occur depends on the magnitudes of
Δc, (2θh − θl)Δq and (2θl − θh)Δq, and the critical difference
between them, 2S − I . (See Table II and Fig. 6.)
Fig. 6 shows a scenario in which the vendors’ services cost
increases (Δc) are convex in their quality difference levels
(Δq). Although the figure is for this specific convex relation-
TABLE II
EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE CONDITIONS: WHEN SWITCHING MODE IS POSSIBLE
Equilibrium Existence Condition
(hH, lH) + Switch Δc < (2θl − θh )Δq − 2S + I
(hL, lL) + Switch Δc > (2θh − θl )Δq + 2S − I
(hH, lL) + Switch (2θl − θh )Δq − 2S + I ≤ Δc ≤ (2θh − θl )Δq + 2S − I
Fig. 6. Equilibria when change in service cost is convex in change in quality.
ship scenario, our analysis applies to any relationship between
service cost and quality. We use Δq for the horizontal axis and
draw three curves: Δc; (2θh − θl)Δq; and (2θl − θh)Δq. We
also marked three critical lengths Z |2S − I| that are defined
as absolute values. They are highlighted as segments between
the Δc curve and the two straight lines. According to the equi-
librium existence conditions listed in Table II, there are three
critical points on the x-axis: a, b, and e. These divide the range
of Δ q into four regions, with different market equilibria in each.
This permits us to explore a vendor’s quality strategy for gaining
lock-in power, when it is able to set its own service quality. We
next analyze both vendors’ actions.
The lower quality Vendor L. Vendor L views H’s service
quality as fixed. It should set the quality low enough so Δq lies
in the region Δq > e. There, H is not cost efficient. This is
because, to support such a large quality difference Δq between
the vendors, H needs to incur a significant Δc, which must be
compensated for with a larger price difference Δp. The clients,
then, will decide to sample L’s service in the Sampling Stage.
This will cause L to be the only vendor able to achieve lock-in
power in the marketplace.
The higher quality Vendor H. Since L’s service quality will
be fixed, H should set its quality level slightly higher than L’s.
Their quality difference, Δq, is in the region a ≤ Δq ≤ b. Here,
H will operate with higher cost efficiency, with a smaller cost
for improving its service quality via Δc. This eventually will be
transferrable to a price difference between the vendors. Thus,
all of the clients will be attracted to H’s services in the Sampling
Stage, making H the only vendor that is able to achieve lock-in
power.
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To summarize, when the vendors’ service cost increase, Δc, is
convex in their quality difference, Δq, the strategy of Vendor H,
for any level of qL for L, is to choose a lower level of qH . This
will result in a small quality difference between the vendors.
In contrast, Vendor L’s strategy, for any level of qH for H, is
to choose a low level of qL , to make a large quality difference
between the two vendors. We again point out that our analysis
is not limited to a convex Δc−Δq relationship, but also may
be applied to other types of Δc−Δq functions.
B. Roles of Switching Cost and Client Willingness-to-Pay
Two factors influence the application of the vendor’s quality
strategy. The first is switching cost S. When it increases, the
vendor’s capability to achieve lock-in power through quality
selection strategy will decrease. This is depicted by the length
of the segment Z, which increases in S in Fig. 6. An increase in S
moves the points a and e to the right and b to the left. As a result,
the outcome regions of (hH, lH) + Switch and (hL, lL) + Switch
shrink, which leaves a smaller space for the vendors to employ
the strategy we described. In the extreme case when point a and
b meet, the outcome region of (hH, lH) + Switch will disappear,
so that Vendor H will never be able to gain exclusive lock-in
power in the competition.
The second factor is the clients’ extent of vertical differen-
tiation, measured by Δθ, the difference in their willingness-
to-pay for quality. A change in Δθ will shift the two straight
lines in Fig. 6. For example, as Δθ increases, the upper line
(2θh − θl)Δq will move up and the lower line (2θl − θh)Δq
will move down. The regions in which the vendors can apply
the quality strategy will shrink as a result. This suggests that, in
a market whose client segments have large differences in their
willingness-to-pay for service quality, there will be little room
for a vendor to use a quality strategy to gain exclusive lock-
in power. In contrast, such a strategy will be more applicable
in a market with client segments that have relatively smaller
differences in their willingness-to-pay. Thus, we assert:
Proposition 4 (Vendor’s Service Quality Strategy) A SaaS
vendor can use quality strategy to gain exclusive lock-in power.
The efficacy of this strategy will decrease in the switching
cost S and the client’s vertical differentiation level Δθ.17
The recommended quality strategy serves as a vendor’s best
response when its competitor’s service quality cannot be con-
trolled by any action of the vendor itself.18 A best response
strategy might be recommended to a new market entrant that
needs to compete with an existing SaaS vendor who already has
a well-established profile in the marketplace. This may also be
instructive for a vendor as market follower who decides to take
on the market leader with quality.
17The proposition applies to any form of the service cost and quality function,
not just the convex function.
18We have not solved for the vendors’ quality decision-making equilibrium.
This will only be tractable if a specific form of the service cost and quality
function is assumed. In lieu of doing additional mathematical analysis here,
we have chosen to focus on other issues that have more direct applicability to
management practice.
V. DISCUSSION
Competition in the SaaS market is more complicated than our
model suggests. Nevertheless, it captures interesting and impor-
tant features, including the vertical and horizontal differentiation
of vendors, and the sampling of fit costs and switching costs.
The model also has the added benefit of enabling us to draw in-
sightful conclusions about the pricing and quality strategies of
service vendors. It will inspire others to think more deeply about
how the SaaS market works. We offer several recommendations
to managers of SaaS providers.
Recommendation #1: Vendors should try to retain valuable clients
and build profitability by implementing beneficial and not adversar-
ial lock-in strategies.
Our model analyzes adverse lock-in caused by exogenous
switching cost. Clients that are locked in will sometimes incur
high FitCost, resulting in a social surplus loss due to the inef-
ficient match between clients and vendors. This encourages us
to think more broadly about the impacts of adverse lock-in in
the SaaS market. Adverse lock-in can also arise due to a SaaS
vendor’s intimate knowledge of a client’s business data and
competitive information. Some SaaS clients may view this as
dangerous because it gives rise to the risks of information mis-
appropriation and knowledge poaching [13]. Adverse lock-in is
undesirable, especially longer term, because it unfairly weights
the interests of one party, the vendor, relative to the interests of
the other party, the client. Clemons et al. [14, p. 27] offer an
especially instructive comment: “ . . . proper outsourcing is like
proper investment management or proper strategic planning.
Unfortunately, outsourcing of complex business processes is so
new that the risks are seldom understood either by clients or by
their outsourcing consultants . . . ” This points to the need for
the vendor to consider what might be the uncertainty discount
for future risks that a client might experience.19
Recommendation #2: Vendors must recognize that switching costs
do not reflect the true costs of knowledge recovery, and implement
contracts that protect the clients’ interests.
We modeled the main switching cost for the client as data re-
covery from the SaaS vendor, and setup costs with the new ven-
dor. These do not consider knowledge recovery though, which
will be a much larger cost. Data can be reclaimed from a busi-
ness partner, but it never is clear whether the knowledge that
it contains has been lost or will be exploited. Thus, the SaaS
vendor will need to think through what it will take to effectively
serve different kinds of clients, where business data and busi-
ness know how may have much greater value. It will need to
structure SaaS relationships with larger clients to ensure that
sensitive competitive information is not lost.
Recommendation #3: SaaS vendors should place a high priority on
investing to enhance the efficiency of their SaaS software develop-
ment capabilities, so improvements in quality can be achieved with
smaller increments in cost over time.
19A forward-looking vendor might create beneficial lock-in early on by
weight-averaging its prices so the client pays less earlier when the risks are
less certain, and more later when the relationships reach a point where balanced
risks and rewards are achievable.
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The Vendor’s Service Quality Strategy Proposition (P4)
showed that, in competition, what really matters is not how
high a SaaS vendor’s service quality can be pushed, but how
efficiently the vendor is able to improve quality while holding
the line on costs. Overinvestment and underinvestment by the
SaaS vendor could lead to its failure. So we ask: What will a
firm need to do to have the capabilities to enhance the efficiency
of its SaaS offerings to match the speed of the market’s growth
in demand for higher quality? A major issue here is investing
to shape the underlying efficiency of the production of SaaS-
related quality and innovations. We observed that the firm-level
cost functions of different vendors will be different. But what
firm capabilities will be important for improving cost efficiency?
Will a long-established software provider be at an advantage?
Or a nimble newcomer?
A large SaaS vendor will need to sort out whether it is un-
derinvesting and overinvesting, since both are possible. Large
vendors will be able to leverage their expertise and experience in
the packaged software market to provide reliable, high-quality
IT services, but they will have a harder time to change their
cost efficiency. Start-up firms may be different. Ries [44] re-
ports that a start-up firm should continually experiment, gather
feedback from its clients and make near real-time modifications
to its software functionality. This approach is unlikely to result
in very large-scale investments, and should not be subject to
overinvestment risk. But this may permit a start-up to enjoy a
process-based efficiency advantage, if it can grow its scale fast
enough too.20 A start-up like this will likely enter the market-
place with a low quality offering, possibly as a market follower
with a minimum viable product that is made available at a lower
price, and then can grow its capabilities from there.
VI. CONCLUSION
We investigated duopolistic competition in the SaaS market,
with vendors differentiated by their application functionality and
service quality. Potential SaaS clients face ex ante uncertainty
in their fit cost of using any vendor, and they must try a vendor’s
application to learn about its value. The competitive game that
models the SaaS setting has two stages. In the first, the clients
choose a vendor and sample its application. In the second, the
clients have an opportunity to switch to another vendor, although
some switching costs will be involved.
The main findings are as follows.
1) In a market setting in which SaaS clients experience high
switching cost, a vendor may wish to employ opportunis-
tic pricing to dominate the market or a nonconfrontational
pricing strategy to segment the market and avoid direct
competition.
2) In addition, switching costs may affect the two vendors
in an unpredictable way; they may benefit one and hurt
the other.
20For example, Salesforce.com [45] was launched in 1999 at the height of the
dotcom era with an announcement about the “end of the software revolution,”
and was recognized as a market leader only several years later. It also is a driver
of one of the “top 25 tech breakthroughs of all time” [15]. These may involve
new ways to package and deliver SaaS, to price it, to incentivize potential clients
to make a commitment, and then stay with a vendor, and so on.
3) Finally, a vendor may wish to implement a best-response
quality strategy by setting its service quality at some
appropriate level to obtain exclusive lock-in power.
Our findings were established based on assumptions that de-
serve scrutiny. We derived the vendors’ pricing strategies with an
equal number of clients in the high and low willingness-to-pay
groups. Will our results be affected if we relax this assumption?
This led us to normalize the number of clients that demand high
quality SaaS services to one, and assume a proportion of clients
that demand low quality services. When the numbers of the two
client groups vary, the vendors will adjust prices and focus on
the larger client group. When there is a high switching cost and
vendors have full lock-in power, the results will be similar as
for the Opportunistic Pricing Proposition (P1) and the Noncon-
frontational Market Segmentation Proposition (P2). When the
vendors do not have full lock-in power and some clients switch
after sampling, the vendors’ equilibrium prices will vary based
on the relative number of clients in each group. The vendors will
put more effort toward attracting the group with more potential
clients, and their equilibrium prices may increase or decrease
based on the change of the relative size of each client group.21
Another assumption we made is that vendors are able to com-
mit to their initial prices. We discussed why we made this mod-
eling choice earlier, but we still must acknowledge that it is
realistic to allow vendors to reduce their prices at a later stage.
Lower prices may serve to: 1) enable the vendor to retain ex-
isting clients and diminish their likelihood to switch to a com-
petitor; 2) attract more of the competitor’s clients to switch; and
3) generate new demand from clients who may be unwilling to
sample the SaaS vendor’s offering at a higher price point. When
both of the vendors reduce their prices, the market will be more
competitive and the equilibrium outcome will be different. To
incorporate price adjustments, a different base model will be
needed.
A simplification of our current model is that all clients have
the same amount of time to sample a vendor’s SaaS offering
for its fit cost, and must make their switching decisions at a
predetermined future time. Different firms will have different
capabilities to acquire and process information to make value-
maximizing decisions. To assess switching time as a realistic
valuation problem, a dynamic model with an embedded option
for the switching time can represent a client’s decision-making
process. This is a good direction for future research.
Finally, we assumed switching costs are exogenously fixed,
and the vendors cannot control them. Vendors have some capac-
ity to determine how the large switching costs will be over time
21For example, in (hH, lL) + Switch equilibrium, Vendor H’s price will
be decreasing in the number of θl –type clients, while Vendor L’s price will be
increasing in it. As the number of θl -type clients grows, that group will get
larger, and both vendors will put more effort into serving it. As a result, H will
reduce its price to attract these clients to switch from L. The lower price will
mean that the H will not be able to exploit its existing θh -type clients much. The
Vendor L, however, will increase its price to exploit its existing θl -type clients a
little more, although the higher price will make it so that this vendor will attract
fewer θh -type clients to switch from Vendor H. Similarly, when the number of
clients in the θl -type clients group decreases, both vendors will put more effort
toward serving the θh -type clients group. Vendor H will increase its price to
exploit its existing θl -type clients more, while Vendor L will reduce its price to
attract θh -type clients to switch from H.
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though [1]. In addition, market competition and vendor incen-
tives are such that some competitors will do service agreement
buyouts, diminishing the stickiness of new clients’ commit-
ments to a service vendor. The vendor may be willing to absorb
or share the cost. The study of SaaS vendors’ competitive strat-
egy should include an endogenous treatment of switching cost
under the vendor’s control. Another model is needed, but it
will give us the power to see how switching cost interacts with
price and quality to determine the SaaS market’s competitive
outcome.
APPENDIX
PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
Lemma 1 (Price-Quality Difference): The ratio of vendors’
price difference to quality difference (ΔpΔq ) determines their ini-
tial trial decisions. If ΔpΔq increases and exceeds θh , all clients
will try the offering of Vendor L; when ΔpΔq drops below θl , all
clients will try the offering of Vendor H; and when ΔpΔq lies in
between, θh clients will try Vendor H and θl clients will try
Vendor L.
Proof: . We first prove the statement: “when ΔpΔq
drops below θl , all clients will try the offering of
Vendor H.” To prove this statement, it is sufficient if we
can show that θl type clients will choose to try out Ven-
dor H at time 0 when ΔpΔq < θl . Denote the expected utility
of a Client θl at time 0 from choosing Vendor H and Ven-
dor L by E[UH ](θl) and E[UL ](θl). We need to prove that
E[UH ](θl) > E[UL ](θl).We can write the first of the two val-
ues as: E[UH ] (θl) = 2 · d∗H l(θl qH − pH − 0.5d∗H l t) + (1−
2d∗H l) [(θlqL − pL − 0.5 (0.5− d∗H l) t)− S].
There are two parts in this client’s expected total util-
ity. The first term is the client’s expected utility if it stays
with the current Vendor H. With probability 2d∗H l , this client
will keep using Vendor H and the expected distance to Ven-
dor H will be 0.5d∗H l . The second part is the client’s ex-
pected utility if it switches to Vendor L. With probability
(1− 2d∗H l), the client will switch and the expected distance to
L is 0.5(0.5− d∗H l). In addition, if this client switches, switch-
ing cost S will be incurred Based on (2a), we observe that
E[UH ](θl) = (θlqL − pL − 0.25t)− S + 2t(d∗H l)2 . Similarly,
we can express E[UL ](θl) as: E[UL ](θl) = 2d∗Ll (θlqL − pL −
0.5d∗Ll t) + (1− 2d∗Ll) [(θlqH − pH − 0.5(0.5− d∗Ll)t)− S].
Applying (2b), we obtain E[UL ](θl) = (θlqH − pH − 0.25t)−
S + 2t(d∗Ll)
2
.
Thus, we have E[UH ](θl ,)− E[UL ](θl ,) = (Δp− θlΔq) +
2t(d∗2H l − d∗2Ll). Plugging in (2a) for d∗H l and (2b) for d∗Ll , we
obtain E[UH ](θl ,)− E[UL ](θl ,) = (Δp− θlΔq)(−2St ) > 0 ⇔
Δp− qlΔq ≤ 10 ⇔ ΔpΔq ≤ θl . So when ΔpΔq < θl , θl clients will
try out Vendor H. And, θh clients will choose Vendor H. This
proves the statement that “when ΔpΔq drops below θl , all clients
will try the offering of Vendor H.”
Using the same method, we can prove that ΔpΔq > θh ⇔
E[UL ](θh) > E[UH (θh)], which means that “if ΔpΔq increases
and exceeds θh , then all of the clients will try the offering
of Vendor L.” And also, we can show that θl < ΔpΔq < θh ⇔
TABLE III
EQUILIBRIUM TYPES AND PRICES: WHEN SWITCHING IS POSSIBLE
Equilibrium Equilibrium Prices
(hH, lH) + Switch pH = 0.5t + (S + I )/3 + (2cH + cL )/3 + (θh + θl )
Δq/6
pL = 0.5t + (2I − S )/3 + (cH + 2cL )/3 − (θh + θl )
Δq/6
(hL, lL) + Switch pH = 0.5t + (2I − S )/3 + (2cH + cL )/3 + (θh + θl )
Δq/6
pL = 0.5t + (S + I )/3 + (cH + 2cL )/3 − (θh + θl )
Δq/6
(hH, lL) + Switch When (2θl − θh )Δq < Δc < (2 · θh − θl )Δq :
pH = 0.5t + 0.5I + (2cH + cL )/3 + (θh + θl )Δq/6;
pL = 0.5t + 0.5I + (2cL + cH )/3 − (θh + θl )Δq/6
 When
(2θh − θl )Δq ≤ Δc ≤ (2 · θh − θl )Δq + 2 · S − I :
pH = 0.5t + 0.5I + cL + (3θh − θl )Δq/2;
pL = 0.5 · t + 0.5I + cL + (θh − θl )Δq/2
 When(2θl − θh )Δq − 2S + I ≤ Δc ≤ (2θl − θh )Δq :
pH = 0.5t + 0.5I + cH + (θh − θl )Δq/2;
pL = 0.5t + 0.5I + cH + (θh − 3θl )Δq/2
E[UH ](θh) > E[UL ](θh) and E[UL ](θl) > E[UH ](θl), which
means “when ΔpΔq lies in between θl and θh ,, the θh clients will
try Vendor H and the θl clients will try Vendor L.” 
Lemma 2 (Switching Cost): When S ≥ 0.5t, no clients will
switch. This is proved together with Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 3 (Vendor Coexistence): When vendors coexist and
the market reaches (θh → H, θl → L) competitive equilib-
rium, the equilibrium prices will be {pL = θlqL − 0.25t; pH =
θlqL + θhΔq − 0.25t}.
Proof: When switching cost S is high enough to lock in all
clients, all other types of equilibria, such as (θh → H, θl → H)
and (θh → L, θl → L), will make at least one vendor not
serve the market. So when both vendors coexist, the mar-
ket must reach the (θh → H, θl → L) competitive outcome.
From Lemma 1, θl≤ΔpΔq ≤ θh must hold. This results in these
conditions for the equilibrium prices: pH ≥ pL + θhΔq and
pL ≤ pH − θlΔq. Meanwhile, there is an upper bound for
the vendors’ prices to assure that at time 0, the vendors
must give the clients nonnegative expected utility so that the
clients will not stay out of the market: pH ≤ θhqH − 0.25t and
pL ≤ θlqL − 0.25t. Also, when these conditions for pH and
pL are satisfied, the two vendors will try to charge as high
prices as possible. Thus, we conclude that the optimal equilib-
rium prices must be pL = θlqL − 0.25t; pH = θlqL + θhΔq −
0.25t. 
Lemma 4 (Equilibrium Solutions): When switching cost is
not high enough to lock in all of the clients, different market
equilibria will appear. The existence conditions for each of the
equilibria are in Table II, and the equilibrium prices are as shown
in Table III.
Proof: To illustrate our approach, we will prove the equilib-
rium for (hH, lL) + Switch. The vendors’ respective optimization
problems involve choosing their profit-maximizing prices, pH
and pL . These results are shown in Section III. Via the first-order
conditions, we obtained the equilibrium prices {pH = 0.5t +
0.5I + (2cH + cL )/3 + (θh + θl)Δq/6; pL = 0.5t + 0.5I +
(2cL + cH )/3− (θh + θl)Δq/6}. Under the condition (2θl −
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θh)Δq < Δc < (2 · θh − θl)Δq, the stated price pair satis-
fies θl < ΔpΔq < θh , as required by the Price–Quality Differ-
ence Lemma 1. Positions of the marginal clients then can be
derived accordingly: d∗H h= 0.25 + S2t +
Δq
6t (2θh − θl)− Δc6t ;
d∗Ll= 0.25 +
S
2t +
Δq
6t (θh − 2θl) + Δc6t . Note that if S ≥ 0.5t,
d∗H h > 0.5 and d∗Ll > 0.5. This means that vendors, if switch-
ing cost is greater than 0.5t, are able to lock in all existing
clients. It is a proof for Lemma 2. However, under the condi-
tion (2θh − θl)Δq ≤ Δc ≤ (2θh − θl)Δq + 2S − I , the above
equilibrium prices will violate the right-hand side inequality
of θl ≤ ΔpΔq ≤ θh . Hence, we need to rederive the equilib-
rium prices that make the constraint ΔpΔq ≤ θh binding, that is,
Δp = θhΔq.
By the tie-breaking rule stated in Footnote 15,
at this ΔpΔq ratio, we will get an (hH, lL) Sam-
pling Stage outcome. Such constrained equilibrium prices
are {pH = 0.5t + 0.5I + cL + (3θh − θl)Δq/2; pL = 0.5t +
0.5I + cL + (θh − θl)Δq/2}. The positions of the marginal
clients are d∗H h = 0.25 + S/2t and d∗Ll = 0.25 + S/2t +
(θh − θl)Δq/t. When S ≥ 0.5t, d∗H h ≥ 0.5 and d∗Ll ≥ 0.5,
which proves Lemma 2. Similarly, under the condition (2θl −
θh)Δq − 2S + I ≤ Δc ≤ (θl − θh)Δq, the left-hand side in-
equality of θl ≤ ΔpΔq ≤ θh is violated. So we need to rederive
the equilibrium prices that make the constraint ΔpΔq ≥ θl bind-
ing, namely, Δp = θlΔq. The constrained equilibrium prices
are {pH = 0.5t + 0.5I + cH + (θh − θl)Δq/2; pL = 0.5t +
0.5I + cH + (θh − 3θl)Δq/2}. The positions of the marginal
clients are d∗H h = 0.25 + S/2t + (θh − θl)Δq/t and d∗Ll =
0.25 + S/2t. So when S ≥ 0.5t, d∗H h > 0.5 and d∗Ll > 0.5,
which proves Lemma 2.
The other two equilibria are analyzed using the same
method. The objective functions in the (hH, lH) + Switch
equilibrium are
Vendor H: Max
pH
(pH − cH ) (2d∗H h + 2d∗H l)− 2I
Vendor L: Max
pL
(pL − cL − I) (1− 2d∗H h + 1− 2d∗H l)
The objective functions in the (hL, lL) + Switch equilib-
rium are
Vendor H: Max
pH
(pH − cH − I) (1− 2d∗Lh + 1− 2d∗Ll)
Vendor L: Max
pL
(pL − cL ) (2d∗Lh + 2d∗Ll)− 2I
For each one can also derive the equilibrium prices and the
positions of the marginal clients. We can show that no clients will
switch when their S ≥ 0.5t too. This is a proof for the Switching
Cost Lemma 2. We omit the detailed proofs for the other two
types of equilibria here due to space limitations. 
Proof of Proposition 1 (Opportunistic Pricing): When
Δc/Δq > θl , if Vendor H charges pH = cL + Δqθl < cH ,
then for any market share, Vendor L must reduce its price to
cL . This is because at any pL > cL , Δp/Δq < θl . Lemma 1
states that no client will choose Vendor L. Vendor H is able to
reduce its price further by some very small value ε so that Ven-
dor H is still able to obtain a profit. Vendor L will go out of the
market though. When Δc/Δq > θh , a similar argument can
be made. Vendor L will be able to use pL = cH −Δqθh to drive
Vendor H out. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (Nonconfrontational Mar-
ket Segmentation): The Vendor Coexistence Lemma 3
proves the market equilibrium. The statement that “there
is no direct competition between the SaaS vendors”
is proved based on the discussion in this article.

Proof of Proposition 3 (Switching Cost Effects): Proving
the Switching Cost Effects Proposition 3 is based on the proof
for the Equilibrium Solutions Lemma 4 and the conditions for
different types of market equilibria to appear. (See Table II.) 
Proof of Proposition 4 (Vendor’s Service Quality Strategy):
The proposition’s conclusion comes directly from the discus-
sions of Fig. 6. 
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